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Abstract—Using communication services is a common part of 
everyday life in a personal or business context. Communication 
services include Internet services like voice services, chat 
service, and web 2.0 technologies (wikis, blogs, etc), but other 
usage areas like home energy management and eMobility are 
will be increasingly tackled. Such communication services 
typically authenticate participants. For this identities of some 
kind are used to identify the communication peer to the user of 
a service or to the service itself. Calling line identification used 
in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) used for Voice over IP 
(VoIP) is just one example. Authentication and identification of 
eCar users for accounting during charging of the eCar is 
another example. Also, further mechanisms rely on identities, 
e.g., whitelists defining allowed communication peers. Trusted 
identities prevent identity spoofing, hence are a basic building 
block for the protection of communication. However, 
providing trusted identities in a practical way is still a difficult 
problem and too often application specific identities are used, 
making identity handling a hassle. Nowadays, many countries 
introduced electronic identity cards, e.g., the German 
“Elektronischer Personalausweis” (ePA). As many German 
citizens will possess an ePA soon, it can be used as security 
token to provide trusted identities. Especially new usage areas 
(like eMobility) should from the start be based on the 
ubiquitous availability of trusted identities. This paper 
describes how identity cards can be integrated within three 
domains: home energy management, vehicle-2-grid 
communication, and SIP-based voice over IP telephony. In all 
three domains, identity cards are used to reliably identify users 
and authenticate participants. As an example for an electronic 
identity card, this paper focuses on the German ePA. 
Keywords - eMobility security; home energy management 
security; VoIP security; Smart Grid security; electronic identity 
card; elektronischer Personalausweis; authentication; 
identification 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Communication services use identifiers to indicate the 
intended recipient of a message or to setup a call. In the old 
telephone system, a telephone number according to ITU-T 
E.164 was used. But further identifiers are used nowadays 
for communication, e.g., email addresses, URLs of personal 
Web page, SIP URIs, Network Access Identifiers (NAI), 
customer numbers, or instant messaging screen names.  
 
 The SIP protocol is used as signaling protocol for Voice 
over IP (VoIP) communication and is also the base for 
different instant messaging applications. It uses a SIP URI to 
identify a user, both the originating and destination party. 
The increasing usage of VoIP leads also to the fact that 
annoyance by unsolicited communication is not restricted to 
email SPAM, but also to voice calls. Such unsolicited 
communication is called SPIT, SPAM over Internet 
Telephony. Some ad hoc countermeasures include the 
filtering of incoming calls using a whitelist of permitted 
callers, a blacklist of denied callers, or to make a decision 
based on the caller’s reputation that may be obtained from a 
reputation system. Also security-critical usages of voice 
communication take place commonly, as e.g., giving a bank 
order over a telephone line, or requesting information from a 
public administration office about the own case.  
However, in all these cases trustworthy information 
about the identity of the communication partner is required 
as well as the verification of the authenticity of the identity 
information by either the communication peer or an 
intermediate component, vouching for the identity of the 
caller/calleé. Otherwise, identities can be spoofed e.g., to 
circumvent whitelists and blacklists. Another issue is that 
obtaining identities must involve some costs; otherwise a 
malicious party can simply change its identifier whenever it 
has bad reputation or is blacklisted.  
The SIP standard defining VoIP signaling supports 
various authentication options that apply certain identifiers. 
Beyond them are direct authentication options but also 
assertions issued by a trusted third party. However, broad 
deployment of such a security solution requires a common 
security infrastructure for identity attestation. As the 
deployment of a new security infrastructure is costly, it is 
attractive to reuse an already existing security infrastructure 
for VoIP/SIP security. With the appearance of electronic 
identity cards as, e.g., the “Elektronischer Personalausweis 
(ePA)” in Germany that provides functionality for 
authentication towards an online service and trusted 
identities, such a security infrastructure is readily available. 
Moreover, the security architecture introduced by an official 
identity card is likely to be considered trustworthy by many 
people as the identity card is issued by the government and 
follows defined rules from the initial user authentication till 
the final identity card emission. Integration of ePA into VoIP 
communication has already been described in short in [1]. 
This paper presents the integration of identity cards in 
mature applications like VoIP communication as well as in 
upcoming applications like home energy management, and 
eMobility. The German “Elektronischer Personalausweis” 
ePA is taken as an example for how an identity card can be 
used for authentication of communication partners and how 
trusted identities of the identity card can be applied in the 
communication. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section II introduces ePA user authentication and ePA web 
authentication as examples of the authentication mechanisms 
of an identity card that is issued by a trusted instance (the 
German government). Section III gives an overview of 
authentication and identification in VoIP communication. 
Section IV describes identity handling in SIP. Section V 
describes different VoIP use cases that would profit from an 
integration of the authentication mechanisms of the 
“Elektronischer Personalausweis” into the SIP protocol. 
Section VI and VII describes the use of the “Elektronischer 
Personalausweis” in the usage area home energy 
management and eMobility respectively. Technical 
approaches and practically viable options for integration 
ePA-based user authentication within SIP/VoIP 
communication, home energy management, and eMobility 
are described. Section VIII provides an outlook, while 
Section IX concludes this paper. 
II. AUTHENTICATION USING THE ELECTRONIC IDENTITY 
CARD EPA 
The authentication function of the ePA allows secure 
transmission of attributes from the ePA to a third party. 
Attributes may be related to a person (name) or to a property 
or characteristic (e.g., age). Even relative attributes like 
“holder is older than 18” are possible. Attributes related to a 
person may be used as identities in VoIP communication. 
The corresponding authentication mechanism hence allows 
identification of communicating parties. The ePA offers 
various forms of authentication. In the following, the 
Extended Access Control is described: 
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Figure 1.  PACE Message Flow 
Extended Access Control between a Terminal and an 
ePA involves three phases, see Figure 1: In the first phase, 
the PACE protocol is executed that is necessary to access the 
ePA. In the second phase, the terminal authenticates against 
the ePA, and in the third phase the ePA authenticates against 
the Terminal. 
 
 PACE: PACE is a password authenticated Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. A session key for protection of 
the communication is set up between the Radio 
Frequency (RF) Reader and the ePA. 
 Terminal authentication: Each terminal has a terminal 
certificate for identification. The certificate is signed by 
a root CA. All root CA certificates are based on an 
international public key infrastructure (PKI). The 
German root CA is hosted by the BSI (Bundesamt für 
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnologie). Terminal 
certificates have a very short lifetime (24 hours). 
However, the ePA does neither have a certificate 
revocation list nor a physical clock. Instead, it stores the 
time of the last successful verification and does only 
accept timestamps that lie in the future. The terminal 
certificate includes information encoding which 
attributes of the user may be provided to that terminal. 
 Chip authentication: A Diffie-Hellman authentication 
using a static chip key is performed to authenticate the 
ePA towards the Terminal.  
 
Another authentication function of the ePA is web 
authentication (cf. Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Web Authentication 
A web server requests authentication of a user by sending 
a UserID Request to the eID server. The eID server provides 
a symmetric key (PSK) as well as a Session ID to the web 
server. The web server sends the PSK, the Session ID, and 
additional information related to the authentication request to 
the client of the user. After sending this message, the web 
server starts polling the eID server for a response of the 
authentication request. Upon reception of information from 
the web server, the client of the user sends an authentication 
request to the eID server. This starts the authentication 
between the eID server and the web client of the user. In the 
process of authentication, the user enters its PIN to activate 
the ePA. The eID server reads the ePA and executes ePA 
function. When this process finished, the eID server sends a 
response upon reception of a polling message of the web 
server. The response includes the result of the authentication 
request. The provider of the web server must ensure that the 
confidentiality of the PSK is protected during transfer, e.g. 
by using TLS/SSL, see [10] for details. Nowadays, eID 
services are offered by various providers, e.g. Bremen 
Online Services GmbH [11], Bundesdruckerei GmbH [12], 
and Deutsche Post Com GmbH [13]. Those providers offer 
integration modules for use in web servers. 
 
This authentication approach can be integrated in existing 
multimedia applications as well as be used for upcoming 
usage areas as shown in the next sections. Keying material 
established by the authentication mechanism (some 
authentication methods support inband key agreement) may 
be used for further protection of, the established 
communication channel (e.g., for protection of integrity and 
confidentiality of VoIP communication, which is out of 
scope of this paper). 
III. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION IN VOIP 
COMMUNICATION 
Main security objectives with relevance for VoIP 
communication concern the authentication and identification 
of participants, and the protection (integrity, confidentiality) 
of signaling and media data. Authentication and 
identification are the basis for the protection of VoIP 
communication; hence the focus of this paper is on 
authentication and identification. This section highlights 
some basic concepts of authentication and identification of 
participants in VoIP communication. 
One may distinguish device authentication and user 
authentication: device authentication authenticates devices, 
even if they are shared between different users. Standard 
voice communication often uses device authentication, e.g., a 
telephone that is available to more than one person but only 
has one telephone number (used as identifier) associated. 
User authentication in contrast authenticates users, hence 
distinguishes between different users even if they use the 
same device. Appropriate identifiers for the intended 
authentication target need to be used. Device authentication 
and user authentication may be used together, or between 
different parties, e.g., device authentication to the service 
provider and user authentication to the calleé. 
Another important point is who authenticates to whom. 
One may distinguish here between unilateral authentication 
and mutual authentication. For example, in unilateral 
authentication, a caller authenticates to a service provider. 
Mutual authentication is used if the service provider also 
authenticates to the caller. Mutual authentication may be 
necessary to avoid certain types of attacks. One example 
may be Man-in-the-Middle attacks, were the attacker 
manages to be an intermediate node in the communication 
path between the user and the server acting as the server 
towards the user and misusing the user credentials towards 
the server.  
The endpoints of authentication are also of interest: the 
caller may authentication to a service provider or to the 
calleé. In the case of mobile phones, a user authenticates to 
the service provider and no end-to-end authentication 
between caller and calleé takes place. This approach is based 
on the trust users have in their service providers. The service 
provider may or may not assert the callers identity to the 
calleé. Asserted identities by a service provider may be 
trustworthy if only one service provider is involved (e.g., if a 
mobile phone connects to another mobile phone in his own 
network). However, if a call involves several service 
providers, the trustworthiness of the asserted identity may be 
much lower. Even worse, if the service provider use different 
technologies like one uses VoIP and the other one PSTN, it 
is more likely that such information is not provided end-to-
end. 
IV. IDENTITY HANDLING IN SIP 
The SIP protocol is the major signaling protocol for VoIP 
communication. It can be used for instant messaging 
(SIMPLE) as well. The SIP protocol defined in RFC3261 [2] 
supports two basic options for providing identity information 
in the SIP header to peers and also several options for 
authenticating users. For the provisioning of identity 
information the From header field defined as part of 
RFC3261 can be used as well as the P-Asserted-Identity 
header field, which is defined in RFC3325 [7]. While the 
first identity field is provided by the client itself, the latter 
one is typically used between trusted intermediaries 
(proxies). The following authentication options utilizing at 
least one of the fields named, but may not always provide 
true end-to-end protection of these fields. This is due to the 
fact that intermediate entities may alter some of the fields. 
This can be done for instance through Back-to-Back User 
Agents, which terminate a session setup in both directions. 
These entities are neither explicitly defined by SIP nor 
forbidden. 
A. SIP with HTTP Digest 
SIP digest authentication is based on HTTP digest 
authentication used by HTTP communication with Web 
servers. It authenticates a client using a username (identity) 
and a password or secret key in a simple challenge-response 
authentication, applying cryptographic hash functions. Thus, 
the password is never sent in the clear. Nevertheless, there 
are some deficiencies in the usage of the HTTP Digest 
scheme, as it does not provide complete message integrity 
and cannot be applied to all messages. Here Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) kicks in, which can be used for signaling 
protection. 
B. SIP with TLS 
The TLS protocol is the successor of the well-known 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. It protects all 
communication on the transport layer for TCP connections 
against loss of integrity, confidentiality and against replay 
attacks. RFC3261 mandates the support of TLS for SIP 
proxies, redirect servers, and registrars to protect SIP 
signaling. Using TLS for User Agents (UAs), the SIP clients, 
is recommended. It provides integrated key-management 
with mutual authentication and secure key distribution. TLS 
is applicable hop-by-hop between UAs and proxies or 
between proxies. The SIP-Secure (SIPS) scheme defined in 
RFC3261 requires the usage of TLS to protect the signaling 
until the last proxy in the call flow. According to RFC3261 
the last hop (from the proxy to the client) remains 
unprotected as a separate signaling connection is used for 
sending and receiving. This deficiency is being handled as 
part of RFC5626, describing an option to use client initiated 
connections also for the return signaling. RFC5923 is 
discussing a similar solution for the connection of two 
communicating proxies (cf. [6]). 
C. S/MIME to protect SIP message body data 
The S/MIME standard is commonly used for encrypting 
and signing emails. RFC3261 recommends S/MIME to be 
used for end-to-end protection of SIP signaling message 
payloads following a similar approach as email. S/MIME 
within SIP supports authentication, integrity protection and 
confidentiality of signaling data. However, S/MIME is not 
widely used in current SIP deployments. One reason may be 
the overhead produced by S/MIME in terms of message size 
and complexity of parsing S/MIME protected content, which 
may be not acceptable in synchronous communication.  
As new scenarios arise, the defined security measures 
within SIP do not always provide a solution. SIP is flexible 
with regard to extending the protocol. Therefore several 
security enhancements have already been standardized. Two 
approaches supporting identity management services needed 
in the different security levels are described in the following 
as prominent examples for extensions. 
D. Authenticated Identity Management  
RFC4474 defines enhancements for SIP providing 
assertions for the user identity (Address of Record) valid in 
the domain the authentication server is responsible for to 
securely identify originators of SIP messages [3]. New 
header fields include a signature used for validating the 
identity and a reference to the certificate of the signer. As 
RFC4474 only addresses the request direction, a further 
standard has been defined: RFC4916 [4] describes the 
application of an authenticated identity service for the 
response direction.  
Unfortunately, both documents do not provide a solution 
suitable for all relevant scenarios. They preferably work in 
adjacent domains. If, however, multiple administrative 
domains are to be traversed, the likelihood increases that a 
Session Border Controller SBC, i.e. a SIP proxy running on 
the border of a network, or a SIP proxy working as Back-to-
Back user agent (B2B UA) is located on the signaling path. 
A B2B UA is a proxy that terminates the signaling traffic in 
both directions. This intermediate node may alter the SIP 
header or even the SIP body, hence destroying the signature 
of the authentication proxy. As the problem of a real end-to-
end identity is not solved with the available solutions, further 
approaches are expected to be proposed. 
E. SIP/SAML 
The Security Assertion Markup Language SAML is an 
XML extension for exchanging security information that has 
been developed by OASIS. SAML is a XML-based 
framework for creating and exchanging security information. 
When SIP requests are received by a server, there may be 
authorization requirements that are orthogonal to 
ascertaining the identity of the User Agent Client (UAC). 
Supplemental authorization information might allow the 
UAC to implement non-identity-based policies that depend 
on further attributes of the principal that originated a SIP 
request. 
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Figure 3.  SAML Usage in SIP 
An Internet draft [5] proposes a method for using SAML 
in collaboration with SIP to accommodate richer 
authorization mechanisms and enable trait-based 
authorization based on roles or traits instead of identity (see 
Figure 3). Moreover, it also defines how SAML assertions 
can be carried within SIP, which can be used end-to-end to 
vouch for a certain identity.  
As stated at the beginning of this section, up to now SIP 
does not provide a universal identity management solution, 
which can be applied in every scenario. Therefore, the 
discussion within the IETF proceeds defining dedicated 
elements in the SIP messages, which may be altered by 
intermediate components, without scarifying the complete 
message identity. There already exist drafts describing 
potential solutions.  
 
V. USAGE AREA VOICE OVER IP COMMUNICATION: 
PROVIDING SIP IDENTITIES THROUGH EPA 
The ePA user authentication can be applied in SIP-based 
VoIP telephony, either directly integrated into or adjacent to 
the SIP protocol 
Different use cases for ePA-based user authentication 
pose different requirements on the technical solution as 
described in the following. The authentication can be 
performed towards the SIP service provider or toward the 
SIP communication peer (calleé), see Figure 4. Therefore, 
also different technical options for integrating ePA-based 
user authentication within SIP are needed.  
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Figure 4.  ePA-based VoIP/SIP User Authentication Scenarios 
A. Use Cases 
User authentication within SIP protocol supported by the 
ePA functionality can be used to realize different application 
scenarios: 
 Authentication of the user towards the SIP service 
provider for authorizing the use of SIP-based 
communication services. An ePA-based user 
authentication is performed when using SIP-based 
communication services. 
 Authentication of the user towards the SIP service 
provider for bootstrapping security credentials needed 
for using SIP-based communication services. An ePA-
based user authentication is performed as part of the 
establishment of a valid SIP-device configuration. 
 Authentication of a user as part of registering with a 
communication service provider using a self-
subscription Web portal. Here, the ePA user 
authentication is not used for technical authentication 
within the SIP application, but to establish the business 
relationship (contract) with a service provider. This may 
happen independently of SIP communication services.  
 Authentication of the user towards an Identity Provider 
independently of the SIP signaling. The Identity 
provider issues an assertion (e.g., SAML assertion) that 
can be used with various communication services. 
Assertions may even be part of SIP.  
 Authentication of the user towards the communication 
partner. Assured user identification or attributes of the 
user (as e.g., the user’s age or even a pseudonym) can be 
provided to the communication peer. This information 
can be used by the communication peer for providing 
personalized communication services. For example, 
when calling a service hotline (merchant, public 
institution as a finance office), the calling user can be 
automatically identified resp. the user’s attributes can be 
verified. When e.g., premium communication services 
are used, attributes as, e.g., the user’s age can be verified 
before providing services. 
 Media encryption: Session keys derived from ePA 
authentication may be used to encrypt the media stream 
towards the SIP service provider or the SIP 
communication peer. However, protection of VoIP 
communication besides authentication is out of scope of 
this paper. 
Using ePA-based authentication towards the 
communication peer cannot be used in all of the described 
use cases. In particular in public SIP service offerings, SIP 
signaling is often terminated by the service provider’s SIP 
server, so that specific SIP signaling may not reach the 
communication peer. This specifically applies to SIP 
headers, which may be added or removed by intermediaries. 
The stated use cases vary concerning the following main 
requirements: 
 
 SIP Protocol Integration: The ePA user authentication 
can be integrated within the SIP protocol itself, or it can 
be performed outside the SIP protocol for establishing a 
security context that may be used within SIP later on.  
 Authentication Peer: The ePA authentication 
information can be performed towards a generic identity 
provider, a SIP service provider, or the communication 
peer.  
 Frequency: An ePA-based user authentication can be 
performed only once to bootstrap SIP security 
configuration, or with each SIP session.  
 
Therefore, different technical solutions for integration of 
ePA-based user authentication within VoIP are outlined in 
the next subsection. 
B. Integration of ePA-based Authentication within SIP 
Different possibilities exist for integrating ePA user 
authentication into SIP applications:  
 
 Manual integration using an online Web authentication 
service: if a voice services requires identification, the 
caller connects to an associated website and uses the 
ePA Web Authentication mechanism. If authentication 
succeeds, a one time password is given to the caller that 
can be used for authentication to voice services, e.g., by 
entering the password using DTMF tones. This 
obviously requires a connection of the voice service 
provider with the ePA authentication infrastructure. 
 
Figure 5.  Manual ePA Integration 
 HTTP Digest within SIP: The ePA authentication 
requires a specific server certificate to activate the ePA 
client authentication. Hence an ePA Web authentication 
is performed first to obtain credentials that are used as 
HTTP Digest parameters within SIP. The same 
requirement as above applies to this example. 
 
 
Figure 6.  ePA integration using HTTP digest 
 Perform ePA client authentication within TLS security 
protocol protecting the SIP signaling channel towards 
the service provider, assumed the service provider 
possess the specific ePA server certificate. This would 
be transparent to the SIP protocol itself and completely 
relies on the usage of SIPS (SIP over TLS). It allows for 
authentication towards the SIP service provider. 
 Authentication towards a separate identity provider 
issuing an identity assertion: A separate identity 
provider asserting identities is a flexible solution that 
allows fine-grain user control of revealed data. 
However, this approach requires both, the calleé and 
caller, to trust the identity provider. Involving a third 
party also poses privacy risks as the identity provider 
can collect caller data. This approach may be performed 
inband the SIP signaling as described for the SAML 
application in SIP.  
 
Figure 7.  ePA integration using identity provider 
 SIP with S/MIME: For end-to-end authentication, the 
integration of the ePA in SIP may use an additional part 
of the SIP message body. This part can be protected 
with S/MIME hence allows for integrity protection of 
the caller information through signing the S/MIME part 
with the callers private key. Moreover, if pseudonyms 
are used in the outer SIP header, the S/MIME part of the 
message may be used to transport the real identity of the 
caller in a privacy protected manner. This can be 
achieved by encrypting the S/MIME part using the 
calleé’s public key (certificate). Note that this requires 
the availability of the calleé’s certificate before 
establishing the call. 
 
C. Reality Check 
From a real-world perspective, the following use cases 
seem to be appropriate:  
 
 ePA Authentication towards a Web Portal: The ePA-
based Web authentication mechanisms is already 
available. Extensions to the SIP protocol are not 
necessary, as HTTP Digest authentication can be used as 
defined. Necessary is the integration of a preceding step 
binding the ePA Web Authentication to the HTTP 
Digest Authentication.  
 ePA Authentication using an Identity Provider 
(SIP/SAML): The ePA-based authentication 
mechanisms is readily available. Extensions to the SIP 
protocol are already defined but it has to be considered, 
that they are still in draft status.  
 ePA Authentication towards SIP Service provider: The 
easiest approach to integrate ePA authentication within 
SIP is to map the Web-based authentication on SIP, i.e. 
to use TLS for server authentication and to transport 
ePA authentication messages within SIP in the same 
way as over HTTP. Here, the SIP service provider needs 
an ePA terminal certificate to verify the user’s identity. 
The SIP service provider may include verified user 
attributes in the SIP signaling towards other SIP service 
providers in case of multiple provider spanning 
connections, e.g., using the P-asserted identity extension 
(cf. [7]). 
 ePA Authentication towards SIP Communication Peer: 
A direct integration within SIP signaling is difficult, as a 
SIP communication partner will usually not possess an 
ePA terminal certificate. The ePA user authentication 
follows a strict client/server principle, not a symmetric 
peer-to-peer like model as VoIP telephony. Also SIP 
signaling will often be terminated by the SIP service 
provider. Therefore a realistic approach seems to run an 
ePA-based user authentication towards a service/identity 
provider. The caller and the calleé may authenticate 
independently. Then known SIP security mechanisms 
can be used for end-to-end security (asserted identity, 
media encryption). The security association is, however, 
not established directly between the communicating 
entities, but by infrastructure nodes that have to be 
trusted. 
VI. USAGE AREA HOME ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
Allowing consumers to monitor their current energy 
usage level, even from remote, is one of the visions of the 
smart grid. The expectation is that energy usage 
monitoring results in a wiser use of energy in everyday 
life. Figure 8 shows a typical smart grid architecture. 
 
Figure 8.  Smart Grid Reference Architecture from [9] 
The architecture includes an “intelligent home” at the 
prosumer side (prosumer=energy PROducer + energy 
conSUMER), especially a HAN Gateway (Home Area 
Network Gateway) that exposes the available information 
on the energy consumption from the home to the outside, 
e.g., the Internet. To protect the smart home against 
attacks from the Internet, it is required to authenticate the 
communication (establishment) at the HAN Gateway. In 
the smart grid system, most communication partners of 
the HAN Gateway are already known and rather static. 
Secure identities are likely to already exist, for instance 
for certain control operations of or pricing information 
from the smart grid. However, secure identities for users 
accessing their HAN Gateway to monitor energy usage 
via Internet do not exist. Electronic identity cards can be 
used here to provide the secure identities needed. 
 
A. Use Cases 
The user can access information about its smart home 
(e.g. energy usage in the home) using a web browser. Several 
ways exist to implement this energy consumption web page: 
1. The HAN Gateway runs a web server and provides the 
web page. The user authenticates towards the HAN 
Gateway using the ePA. However, this would require 
the HAN Gateway to implement an eID server. This 
means that the HAN gateway must comply to the very 
strict requirements defined in [10], which for example 
requires a hardware security module.  
2. The utility provides the web page and polls the HAN 
Gateway for information. In this case, the user 
authenticates towards the utility using the ePA. The 
utility uses existing security associations that are 
independent of the ePA authentication to secure 
communication with the HAN Gateway. The prosumer 
could also use the ePA authentication towards the utility 
to establish or change contractual agreements as e.g. the 
selected tariff.  
B. Options for Integration ePA-based User Authentication  
Different possibilities exist for integrating ePA user 
authentication with HTTP access to the web page over a 
public network (Internet) providing information about the 
HAN Gateway:  
 Direct use of web authentication (see section II) 
 HTTP Digest: The HTTP protocol is used to establish a 
session between the HAN Gateway and the user. The 
ePA authentication requires a specific server certificate 
to activate the ePA client authentication. Hence an ePA 
Web authentication is performed first to obtain 
credentials that are used as HTTP Digest parameters 
within HTTP access towards the Web server (see Figure 
9. ).  
 
 
Figure 9.  ePA integration using intermediate credential provider 
 Perform ePA client authentication within the TLS 
security protocol protecting the communication towards 
the web server, assuming the HAN Gateway possesses 
the specific ePA server certificate. 
 Authentication towards a separate identity provider 
issuing an identity assertion (see Figure 10. ): A separate 
identity provider asserting identities is a flexible solution 
that allows fine-grained user control of revealed data. 
However, this approach requires both communication 
parties to trust the identity provider. In the home energy 
monitoring use case, the utility may for example be such 
a trusted party. Involving a third party also poses 
privacy risks as the identity provider can collect service 
usage information. Here, it may be possible to use 
SAML or Kerberos to issue a security token asserting 
the successful authentication towards the identity 
provider 
 
Figure 10.  ePA integration using identity provider 
C. Reality Check 
From a real-world perspective, the following use cases 
could be realized:  
 Direct use of web authentication: This integration 
approach seems to be only realistic if the utility provides 
the web site that the user accesses. In particular, a 
special server certificate is needed for the web server to 
interact with the ePA. Expecting each HAN Gateway to 
obtain such a server certificate seems unrealistic. 
Moreover, often HAN Gateways in a residential area 
will be connected via a Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) or 
power line communication and may therefore not be 
accessible by the prosumer directly (they do not have a 
public, static IP address, requiring services like 
MobileIP or DynDNS, to make them accessible from the 
public Internet).  
 HTTP Digest: As with the approach above, this 
approach seems to be only realistic if the web site that 
the user accesses, is provided by the utility. However, 
this kind of session establishment involves an 
unnecessary indirection. This indirection may be 
justified if the HAN Gateway does not possess a fixed 
IP address, e.g., through connectivity via DSL. Thus 
address resolution for the HAN gateway is necessary. 
This may be achieved by having the HAN gateway 
permanently registered with a utility server, detecting IP 
address changes via the registration messages. This 
registration should be done using a secured connection 
between the HAN Gateway and the utility server. This 
utility server may then also perform the HTTP digest 
authentication mechanism and act as a proxy for remote 
access to the HAN Gateway. 
 ePA Authentication towards a Web Portal or an 
Identity Provider (SAML): The utility can provide 
identities as it has a customer relationship with the user.  
 
As the usage are home energy management is not yet 
mature, there is still the opportunity to embed ePA 
authentication into emerging protocols and standards. 
VII. USAGE AREA CHARGING SPOT ACCESS  
Electric vehicles are becoming more and more important 
in the national and international strategies, e.g., to reduce 
CO2 emissions. The integration of e-cars into the Smart Grid 
is still an evolving issue. Architectures like seen in Figure 
11. are currently emerging. 
 
Figure 11.  eMobility Extension of Smart Grid Reference Architecture 
from [9] 
Authentication using the ePA can be useful for usage 
authorization at public charging spots. An authentication 
using a secure identity is important as the identity is used for 
accounting and billing. A user lock-in by different solutions 
of different vendors can be avoided if the already available 
ePA infrastructure is used for authentication. A charging 
provider could re-use an existing authentication 
infrastructure without having to issue separate authentication 
tokens. This has to be evaluated regarding potential privacy 
issues when re-using an authentication service revealing the 
user identity. 
A. Use Cases 
The user authenticates towards a charging spot before the 
user’s electric car is charged. 
B. Options for Integration ePA-based User Authentication  
Different possibilities exist for integrating ePA user 
authentication as the user may authenticate directly at the 
charging spot or from inside the car. This requires the 
appropriate ePA interfaces on either the car or the charging 
spot. In the following, the focus is ePA authentication at the 
charging spot directly:  
 Direct terminal authentication (see Section II): Each 
charging spot is acting as terminal for ePA 
authentication. 
 HTTP Digest (see Figure 12. ): The charging spot uses 
HTTP to establish a session with the charging provider 
in the backend system. The ePA authentication requires 
a specific server certificate to activate the ePA client 
authentication. Hence an ePA Web authentication is 
performed first to obtain credentials that are used as 
HTTP Digest parameters.  
 
Figure 12.  ePA integration using HTTP digest 
 Perform ePA client authentication within the TLS 
security protocol protecting communication towards the 
charging service provider, where the charging provider 
possesses the specific ePA server certificate. 
 Authentication towards a separate identity provider 
issuing an identity assertion (see Figure 13. ): A separate 
identity provider asserting identities is a flexible solution 
that allows fine-grained user control of revealed data. 
This approach allows easy integration with existing 
authentication solutions. However, this approach 
requires both the charging spot provider and the user to 
trust the identity provider. Involving a third party also 
poses privacy risks as the identity provider can collect 
mobility data. This approach may use for example 
SAML Assertions.or Kerberos tickets. 
 
The identity used for authentication is the name of the 
user, potentially together with the user’s address information. 
However, the current design of charging points often 
requires a contract ID instead of a real user name. The 
contract ID is linked with a name (resp. an associated 
database entry) in the backend system. 
 
 
Figure 13.  ePA integration using identity provider 
C. Reality Check 
From a real-world perspective, the following use cases 
could be realized, assuming that the charging spot provides 
the required interfaces for ePA interaction:  
 Direct terminal authentication requires ePA server 
certificate for acting as a terminal as well as additional 
hardware [14], which may result in higher costs for 
charging spots.  
 HTTP Digest: This approach could be implemented 
using available technology. 
 ePA Authentication towards an Identity Provider 
(SAML): The ePA-based authentication mechanisms is 
available and the charging provider may serve as 
identity provider.  
VIII. OUTLOOK 
Based on the use cases and potential solution options 
stated for the usage areas voice over IP communication, 
home energy management, and vehicle-to-grid integration 
the evolvement of identity card (e.g., ePA) based 
authentication in well established applications as well as in 
upcoming applications is highly expected. This expectation 
is supported by the fact that there is an available central 
authentication infrastructure, which can easily be used within 
a variety of services requiring authentication or some form of 
assertions of characteristics like the age of a person.  
Moreover, from a technical point of view, it is also 
possible to load further applications onto the identity card, 
which enables further authentication schemes to be executed 
directly on the identity card supporting even more scenarios 
and usage areas by using the identity a universal secure 
transmission device of authentication credentials and 
applications. This would even enable further usage of the 
identity card in the curse of key management protocols, e.g., 
to agree on a session secret used to provide integrity or 
confidentiality or to simply serve as hardware based key 
generator for the key management protocol. Note, that the 
legal ramifications having multiple applications residing on 
one identity card as base for this option need to be further 
elaborated.  
Regarding the direct utilization within SIP, further 
investigation into the enhancement of currently defined 
assertion or claim based service support to better utilize ePA 
functionality is recommended. Thanks to the SIP 
extensibility, new authentication services may be added 
without changing the base protocol. Some of the stated use 
cases in Section V apply the ePA for the initial security 
bootstrapping of SIP user environments. This option should 
be investigated more deeply, e.g., in the context of already 
established frameworks like the GBA (Generic 
Bootstrapping Architecture) or SACRED, (Securely 
Available Credentials, RFC 3760), as it provides a more 
generic bootstrapping option. 
Regarding home energy management and vehicle-2-grid, 
embedding the use of identity cards into upcoming protocols 
and standards is an important issue. Moreover, as already 
stated the possibility to load own applications onto an 
identity card may provide even further solution spaces. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper gives on overview on different aspects of 
authentication and identity management for voice 
communication, home energy management as well as 
eMobility. For authentication and identity management, 
identity cards like the German “Elektronischer 
Personalausweis” (ePA) can be used. In Germany, a security 
infrastructure for identity management using the ePA is 
provided that is highly trusted and can be beneficial for 
protecting mature applications like voice communication as 
well as upcoming applications like home energy 
management and vehicle-2-grid. This paper presented a 
number of options for integrating an ePA-based user 
authentication in protocols typically used in voice over IP 
communication (SIP - Session Initiation Protocol), home 
energy management, and vehicle-2-grid. Identification and 
authentication are important building blocks in the protection 
of communication in all three usage areas. They may serve 
as a base for the exchange of further (session based) keying 
material which may be used for further protection of the 
session, e.g., for protection of integrity and confidentiality. 
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